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THE DANGERS OF FIGHTING TERRORISM WITH
TECHNOCOMMUNITARIANISM:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF FREE
EXPRESSION, EXPLORATION, AND
UNMONITORED ACTIVITY IN URBAN SPACES
Marc Jonathan Blitz *
The narrower the circle to which we commit ourselves, the less freedom
of individuality we possess . . . . In a narrow circle, one can preserve
one’s individuality, as a rule, in only two ways. Either one leads the
circle (it is for this reason that strong personalities like to be “number one
in the village”), or one exists in it only externally, being independent of it
in all essential matters.
— Georg Simmel, Group Expansion and the Development of
Individuality 1

INTRODUCTION
The cult television series “The Prisoner” tells the story of a man who,
after losing and then regaining consciousness, opens the blinds of his
London flat to find that the world outside has undergone a Kafkaesque
transformation: the skyscrapers and city streets visible from his window
have been replaced with a small and serene village.2 Accompanying this
*

Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law. The discussion in this
paper grew out of, and benefited immensely from workshops and individual discussions
with many law school faculty members and attorneys. Many of the proposals in this article
originated in discussions with Chad Oldfather and Eduardo M. Peñalver regarding the
respects in which emerging video surveillance systems resemble the natural surveillance
that already exists in many small communities. It also benefited from provocative questions
and/or thoughts regarding privacy and video (or other forms of) surveillance from David
Medine, Becky Burr, Will DeVries, Joseph Onek, Sharon Bradford Franklin, Deirdre
Mulligan, David Yang, Tara Wheatland, Jeffrey Rosen, John Shore, Christopher Slobogin,
and John Eden. I also owe many thanks to Michael Dallal, Marni Brot, Amy Lambert,
Jessica Berenbroick and the other editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal who organized
this Symposium and provided substantial assistance with this article.
1. Georg Simmel, Group Expansion and the Development of Individuality, in ON
INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL FORMS 251, 255 (Donald Levine ed., 1971).
2. See ALAIN CARRAZE & HELENE OSWALD, THE PRISONER 35 (1990) (providing a
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stark change in his external environment is a sharp decrease in his freedom.
Whereas his life in London was his own, he discovers upon venturing out
into the village 3 that his decisions and actions are now community
property. He is watched everywhere he goes both by neighbors and hidden
cameras. 4 He is expected to be an enthusiastic participant in all communal
events, and is ostracized as “unmutual” when he instead seeks out privacy
and seclusion. 5 The town’s authorities are intent on ensuring that residents
cannot opt out of village life: quaint taxis transport people within the
village, but never outside of it; phone service is strictly local; maps at the
village store show nothing beyond the community’s boundaries.6 Each
showing of independence or defiance by the protagonist brings strong
pressure from the authorities to fully account for (and recant) his actions.7
In short, his familiar urban life is replaced with a communitarian dystopia,
hostile to privacy and deeply suspicious of every act of individuality. 8
The story of environmental shock depicted in this television series has
also made an appearance in sociological observation. Decades ago, one of
the founders of sociology, Georg Simmel, imagined what it would be like
for an inhabitant of a modern metropolis to be suddenly lifted out of his
urban existence and dropped into the smaller and more confining world of
an ancient or medieval village. The modern city dweller, said Simmel,
“could not even breathe under such conditions.”9 He could not tolerate the
“limits upon [his] movements” or the restrictions on “his relationships with
the outside world.” 10 Nor could he suffer the loss of the “inner
independence and differentiation” that would accompany such a shift from
the city to a close knit, loyalty-demanding community. 11 While such an
environment may have seemed tolerable to individuals born and bred
within its confines, it would be insufferable, said Simmel, to anyone who
long enjoyed the individual freedom made possible by the anonymity and
summary and episode guide to the television series).
3. The community is called only “the Village” by its inhabitants and rulers.
4. CARRAZE & OSWALD, supra note 2 at 38, 153-57.
5. Id. at 153-57.
6. Id. at 35-36.
7. See, e.g., id. at 46-47, 153-57.
8. Somewhat ironically, the main character does succeed in completely retaining
anonymity with respect to at least one outside party: television viewers never learn his real
name, as he is referred to in the Village only as “Number 6.” See generally CARRAZE &
OSWALD, supra note 2.
9. Georg Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life, in ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL
FORMS 324, 333 (Donald Levine ed., 1971) [hereinafter Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental
Life].
10. Id.
11. Id.
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incomparable diversity of modern city life.
This modern urban
environment, he stressed, provides individuals with a “type and degree of
personal freedom to which there is no analogy in other circumstances.”12
In the limited space of a small village, one can express individuality only
when acting as a leader, as the “number one” figure “in the village,” or
when “exist[ing] in it only externally [as an outcast].” 13 By contrast, in city
life, the multitude of options and the indifference of neighbors provide
people with plenty of room to follow their own unique paths while still
being part and parcel of the larger urban community. As E.B White has
written in his celebration of New York, city life can thus blend “the gift of
privacy with the excitement of participation.” 14
But if the unparalleled individual freedom one gains in urban anonymity
is deeply valued, is it also constitutionally protected? If municipal or state
governments decide, for example, that the extensive freedom and
anonymity provided by modern city life not only provides valuable room
for individuality, but also worrisome hiding space for terrorists or
criminals, can they take measures to “roll back” some of this unmonitored
space? Can they make it more difficult for individuals to escape
government monitoring or avoid identification in public places? Or would
such a transformation cross important First Amendment or other
constitutional boundary lines?
These questions are important ones as cities, police departments, and
other government actors struggle with the difficult challenges associated
with protecting urban areas against terrorism in the wake of the September
11 attacks and those in Madrid and London. The dangers of terrorism
predictably cause such actors (and the citizens they represent) to take more
interest in others’ (possibly dangerous) actions. New chemical and
biological weapons allow hateful individuals and small organizations to

12. Id. at 332.
13. Georg Simmel, Group Expansion and the Development of Individuality, supra note
1, at 261 (Donald Levine ed., 1971).
14. See E.B. WHITE, HERE IS NEW YORK 22 (Little Bookroom 1999) (1949), available at
http://mbhs.bergtraum.k12.ny.us/cybereng/shorts/white.html (last visited September 5,
2005). I am indebted to Kenneth Jackson for informing me, and other audience members, of
this E.B. White quote in his introductory remarks at the Symposium which gave rise to this
article. See also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 237-38
(1990) (defining “city life” as “the being together of strangers” and emphasizing that while
city dwellers are “bound together” they can follow diverse ends, rather committing
themselves to “shared final ends”); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1047, 1049 (1996) (claiming that city life establishes common bonds between
residents not by “cultivating a feeling of oneness,” but rather by “fostering a recognition that
one has to share one’s life with strangers, with strangeness, with the inassimilable, even the
intolerable”).
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cause fatalities and economic destruction of a magnitude that could
previously have been inflicted only by a large and highly visible army. Not
surprisingly, law enforcement and other officials have taken a keen interest
in powerful surveillance and identification technologies that might allow
them to more effectively locate and thwart these very dangerous and
difficult to detect threats. Not surprisingly, while such technologies may
well undermine the freedoms we are used to finding in cities, many
officials and citizens alike now wonder whether this is a sacrifice worth
making—and whether the unparalleled anonymity and freedom that we are
now accustomed to in cities is a luxury that we can no longer afford in the
current security context. As Simmel himself recognized when describing
the individual freedom one finds in the metropolis, such freedom is
unlikely to flourish in a society that feels itself under “an incessant threat
against its existence by enemies near and far.” 15
As a result, the nature of city life appears to be changing. On the streets
of London, which “The Prisoner” presented over three decades ago as a
striking contrast to the claustrophobic and camera-monitored confines of
the main character’s new and involuntarily-imposed community,
individuals are now watched constantly by cameras as they walk from
block to block or drive down the road. As Jeffrey Rosen observed, there
are 4.2 million cameras in Britain, many in London proper, including
“speed cameras and red-light cameras, cameras in lobbies and elevators, in
hotels and restaurants, in nursery schools and high schools.”16 In part,
these cameras are intended to protect citizens against terrorism: they were
used to gather invaluable data about the July 2005 terrorist strikes against
the London public transport system. 17 But they have also been used to
gather significant information from street life and shopping malls that is
unrelated to terror attacks or serious crimes. 18 Far from worrying that such
routine monitoring of citizens will undercut individualism, the British
government has taken the stance that citizens should have no anxieties
about submitting themselves to external observation since, in the words of
a pro-camera campaign slogan, “[i]f you’ve got nothing to hide, you’ve got

15. Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life, supra note 9, at 333.
16. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE 36-37 (2004).
17. See Will Knight, CCTV Footage Shows London Suicide Bombers, NEW
SCIENTIST.COM (July 13, 2005), at http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7669 (last
visited July 16, 2005) (reporting that “[s]urveillance cameras provided a vital breakthrough
in the hunt responsible for the four bomb blasts that killed at least 52 people in London, UK
on 7 July”).
18. See ROSEN, supra note 16, at 48-54 (describing use of video surveillance cameras
for banning certain individuals from malls and observation of non-criminal activity).
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nothing to fear.” 19
Just as significant as the spread of cameras is the fast embrace of new
technologies that can instantaneously identify strangers as they walk
through public spaces. Americans today have some experience with these
technologies; they realize that they leave a trail of information about their
whereabouts and activities whenever they use credit cards, make calls on
cell phones, or drive their cars through electronic tollway systems. The
future also promises to bring newer, more powerful identification
technologies which are even more difficult to escape. The last decade, for
example, witnessed tremendous growth in the use of “biometric”
technologies which identify people by their distinctive physiological
features. Citizens might be identified with iris or retinal scanners, or with
devices that allow entry into parks or plazas only in return for an
identifiable hand scan or fingerprint. Cameras might also be equipped with
“face recognition software” that matches a person walking on a street to a
“face print” in a database. 20
Such technologies are already in use, on an experimental basis, in
airports and at sporting events. The war on terrorism has bolstered interest
in their use. The Defense Department, for example, conducted a “Human
Identification at a Distance program” to “develop automated biometric
identification technologies to detect, recognize and identify humans at great
distances” providing “critical early warning support for force protection
and homeland defense against terrorist, criminal, and other human-based
threats.” 21 The Defense Department has also encouraged development of
so-called “3-D Combat Zone” technology that will not only be able to
identify “vehicles by size, color, shape, and license tag” but also identify
the faces of drivers and passengers. 22
While many observers have expressed deep concern about this
transformation of urban space, others have argued that, implemented
correctly, such a technological transformation might make city life more
communitarian, that is, city life would be more like a small town where

19. Id. at 36.
20. See generally SAMIR NANAVATI ET AL., BIOMETRICS: IDENTITY VERIFICATION IN A
NETWORKED WORLD (2002); JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., BIOMETRICS: IDENTITY
ASSURANCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2003).
21. See David Goldberg, Human ID at a Distance, 21C MAGAZINE, at
http://www.21cmagazine.com /issue2/iao_remix/humanid.html (last visited May 15, 2005).
22. See Michael J. Sniffen, Pentagon Wants City-Wide Vision, AKRON BEACON J., July
2, 2003, at A6. Although the technology is primarily for combat, the technology itself could
conceivably be employed to monitor potential threats within America’s borders. See Cynthia
L. Webb, Newsbytes News Network, Government IT Review, TECHNEWS.COM, July 2, 2003,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com.
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everyone knows each other and knows a lot about what they do. This, they
stress, need not be such a terrifying prospect. David Brin, for example,
argues that tremendous good can result when emerging surveillance
technologies transform each “metropolis” into “an easily spanned village.”
After such a transformation, he explains, citizens might well feel safer in
public walking under the protective gaze of powerful cameras while
simultaneously “us[ing] the godlike power [that comes with these cameras]
to zoom at will from vantage point to vantage point.”23 Knowing that their
“[h]omes are sacrosanct,” and that the sacrifice of public anonymity is the
price they must pay to exploit the wonders of new crime-fighting tools,
citizens will be able to bear—and benefit from—a world of ubiquitous
cameras and microphones. 24
Others echo Brin’s optimism about the rapid spread of cameras, and
many have become more receptive to it as Americans’ fear of terrorism has
grown. Adam L. Penenberg, for example, writes that “[e]ven as we trade
privacy for security and convenience, we’re hardly headed toward
totalitarianism.” 25 Citizens, he writes, “have already learned to use
surveillance tools to keep government accountable” and “transparency . . .
is almost always a good thing.” 26 While privacy in the home remains
important, “[i]n public institutions and on city streets, the more
transparency the better.” 27 Amitai Etzioni likewise proposes that, in
determining how to balance the value of privacy with that of the common
good, Americans often give short shrift to the latter.28 One measure he
considers to “correct the imbalance” is to employ the use of biometric
identifiers. 29 Indeed, he says, “[t]he minimal opposition to cameras
installed in many public places suggests that citizens may be less opposed
to some kinds of biometric ID technologies than to ID cards.” 30
Still, such accounts of how cities might become more like small towns
do not answer the question of whether cities’ current movements in this
direction raise any constitutional problems. Are cities free to reconceive
themselves in this way? Are they unhindered by First Amendment
anonymity protections or other constitutional civil liberties when they
23. DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 9 (1998).
24. Id.
25. Adam L. Penenberg, The Surveillance Society, WIRED, Dec. 2001, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.12/surveillance.html.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 9-10 (1999).
29. Id. at 10, 115-16.
30. Id. at 117.
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install face recognition, iris scanners, or other identification technologies in
plazas, streets, or train stations? To ask the same question in a slightly
different way, is American constitutionalism neutral between the vision of
urban life presented by Simmel and that offered more recently by Brin?31
Does the Constitution in any sense favor urban landscapes that allow for
greater freedom and individuality? Or do defenders of such individualism
simply have to make peace with the notion that the openness and
anonymity of twentieth-century cities was just a historical phase rather than
a constitutional right, and that American Constitutionalism places no
constraints on cities that prevent them from evolving into closelymonitored spaces very different from what they once were?
I already addressed such questions from one angle in a previous article,
where I argued that public video surveillance systems should be found in
some circumstances to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches.32 I argued that the Fourth
Amendment, although currently defined as protecting “reasonable
expectations of privacy,” should instead be understood to protect certain
features of environments, both private and public, that provide Americans
with a certain minimal level of insulation against excessive government
monitoring. 33 That article, however, dealt only in passing with the question
raised above; namely, what grounds exist for viewing the anonymity and
freedom that one finds in modern urban life as fundamental features of the
constitutional landscape? Why not allow such anonymity and freedom to
fade as cities evolve in a direction incompatible with them—or be traded
away for other benefits if elected city, state, or federal representatives
decide, under voters’ watch, that security concerns demand a new balance
between privacy, liberty, and other interests?
This article suggests that there is already a powerful answer to this
question implicit in modern First Amendment jurisprudence. Unlike
modern Fourth Amendment case law, which gives short shrift to the
importance of insulating public space from government control and
design, 34 modern First Amendment law places meaningful limits on the
control that governmental authorities may exercise over streets, parks, and
other public spaces central to urban life. It also stringently protects the
anonymity that individuals may retain in such public spaces—for example,

31. See supra notes 9-15, 23-24 and accompanying text.
32. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1349, 1480-81 (2004).
33. See id. at 1434-49.
34. See id. at 1357-59, 1366-74.
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when they distribute unsigned leaflets or present controversial views to
strangers on a public street. These limits suggest there are constitutional
boundaries on the extent to which governments may transform urban
spaces (and other public spaces) in which their citizens live. While cities
have significant freedom to redesign themselves, they may not trade away
those elements of the urban environment that have evolved into crucial
supports for freedom of expression and intellectual exploration. In this
sense, the liberty-enabling features of streets, parks, and plazas are akin to
historic buildings that have become central to a city or a neighborhood’s
identity. They have become an integral and defining part of Americans’
constitutional life and, as such, have earned a claim to preservation that
distinguishes them from other features of the urban landscape. 35
Part I of this article examines how some commentators can plausibly
argue that constitutional liberty and privacy protections do not protect the
individual liberty and privacy that modern individuals have come to expect
in many public spaces, particularly in urban environments.36 Why is it not
clear that identification technologies that might chill speech run afoul of
speech protections? Constitutional liberalism, this section points out,
makes this question a difficult one, because it is marked by scrupulous
neutrality towards different visions of “the good life.” In other words, the
constitutional order does not condemn those who choose a communitarian
way of life and favor those who prefer individualism. Rather, it tolerates
both of these (and other) preferences about one’s social and cultural
environment, and leaves citizens free to opt for the life of their choice.
Given this neutrality, one might argue, it would be wrong to interpret the
United States Constitution as somehow forcing individualism on cities and
their inhabitants if a majority of them may be willing to forsake it in return
for greater security or other benefits. Arguments based on constitutional
interpretation present additional reasons to let city governments (or
inhabitants) abandon long-standing freedoms which are characteristic of
urban life. For example, proponents of the view that constitutional
interpretation must remain deeply anchored in the “original understanding”
of the Constitution’s text might argue that this understanding could not
have included protection of modern urban freedoms. Making this argument
quite plausible is the fact that the liberties that late-nineteenth and early

35. This is not to say that existing First Amendment jurisprudence prevents cities from
closing any given park, street or plaza. Rather, it assures that when governments do provide
citizens such features of cities – as they can hardly avoid doing – they provide them under
rules and conditions that respect the basic First Amendment requirements applicable to these
public spaces.
36. See infra notes 39-71 and accompanying text.
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twentieth century observers (such as Simmel) celebrated in urban
environments did not exist when the Constitution was drafted a century
earlier. At that time, many of the great American metropolises were less
distinctly urban and more akin to small towns.
If, by contrast, one believes that constitutional interpretation should
change as society changes, then why not let conceptions of First
Amendment and other constitutional rights change with developments in
citizens’ conceptions of liberty, privacy, and security, and the proper
relationship between them? To the extent that city life is marked by
continual transformation of cities’ physical structure and social fabric,
perhaps the proper forum for individualists and communitarians to spar
over the direction of such transformation is not in constitutional law at all,
but in the vigorous policy debates that play a vital role in democratic
governance. The future of urban existence may very well be shaped by
debates over architecture, park design, and zoning laws rather than debates
over the meaning of the First Amendment.
Part II sketches an answer to these challenges and suggests a reason
for courts and others to find that freedom-enabling institutions that did not
exist earlier in American history, and might cease to exist in the future,
deserve certain constitutional protection while they are here. 37 This part
addresses these challenges by explaining that however counterintuitive this
claim may seem, it receives a strong and implicit endorsement in the way
that scholars and courts analyze the First Amendment, the Internet, and the
intersection between them. In short, I suggest that it is difficult to make
sense of our modern jurisprudence of First Amendment rights, especially as
they relate to anonymous communication and association on the Internet
and elsewhere, unless one allows room in our constitutional law for a
jurisprudence that “captures” and preserves social incarnations of liberty
and privacy that were not yet in existence when the Constitution was
drafted. Courts defenses of Internet anonymity provide one example of
such a liberty-preserving doctrine.
In Part III, I explain why defending the urban freedom identified by
Georg Simmel deserves a place in constitutional jurisprudence for largely
the same reason. Like the virtual liberation offered by the Internet, city life
offered and continues to offer an invaluable refuge for substantial
expressive activity and intellectual exploration that would be far more
elusive without this type of urban existence. 38 It provides individuals with
an incredibly rich bazaar of ideas, and allows them to browse among these

37. See infra notes 72-119 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 120-163 and accompanying text.

BLITZ_CHRISTENSEN

110

2/3/2011 10:04 PM

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

Vol.XXXII

ideas, substantially free from outside monitoring or control. While First
Amendment law does not single out urban environments for
protection, it protects such environments indirectly by preserving
certain opportunities that are characteristic of modern urban life:
opportunities for giving speeches to large crowds, for confronting
strangers with ideas they may find unfamiliar or provocative, or for
speaking or gathering information in the anonymity of the crowd. A
person may sometimes find such opportunities in small towns as well
as cities. But it is in urban environments where one finds the most
numerous and frequent opportunities both for broadcasting one’s
views and for hiding them. And I suggest here that defending this
feature of urban settings does not undercut our constitutional regime’s
tolerance of, and neutrality toward, different visions of the good, so long as
we are assured that the freedom-enhancing environment of the city can
continue to exist alongside of, and not in place of, alternative forms of
collective life.

PART I: URBAN SPACES, SURVEILLANCE, AND THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT
TO REDESIGN ONE’S COMMUNITY
Urban environments have long been a refuge for those seeking the
freedom that comes with privacy and anonymity. As Jane Jacobs notes,
“[p]rivacy is precious in cities” and far more attainable there than in most
places: “In small settlements everyone knows your affairs. In the city
everyone does not—only those you choose to tell will know much about
you.” 39 That may well be changing. Indeed, some cities may soon be
among the places where it is hardest to escape public identification and
monitoring. Thanks to London’s embrace of ubiquitous cameras, the
average Londoner is now captured on video hundreds of times each day. 40
Many officials and municipal governments in America are exploring
ways to ensure that such images capture not only faces, but also names.
New York City, for example, has reportedly explored mounting a hundred
cameras equipped with face recognition technology over Times Square.41
Proposals for requiring information-loaded ID cards have become more

39. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 58 (3d. ed. 1961).
40. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 214 (2002).
41. See Morning Edition: Profile: Use of Surveillance Cameras in New York City and
Other Places Around the World (NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 25, 2002, 10:00 a.m.)
(discussing talks about installing “a hundred cameras with face recognition software in
Times Square”), transcript available at LEXIS News Library.
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common since 2001. And where such emerging technology does not work,
law enforcement might take advantage of a host of other recent
developments—including electronic tollways and ubiquitous cell phone
and credit card usage—to track people and retrace their activities on a
particular day.
Does this transformation of anonymous spaces into constantlymonitored zones raise constitutional difficulties? One might think the
answer is clear. The Constitution protects anonymous speech and
association. 42 It also shields individuals from attempts to “contract the
spectrum of available knowledge.” 43 It provides people with privacy
protection, which they take with them as they “step from their homes onto
the public sidewalks.” 44 As Christopher Slobogin has demonstrated,
pervasive public video surveillance has dire consequences for the
“anonymity in public [that] promotes freedom of action and an open
society.” 45 How then could one deny that the Constitution stands as a
barrier against new surveillance measures in cities that reduce anonymity,
“chill” information-gathering, and monitor people on streets and
sidewalks?
While I will ultimately argue that the Constitution provides precisely
such protection, this argument is not as straightforward as it has seemed to
some privacy advocates. On the contrary, anyone who wishes to invoke
constitutional anonymity protections to limit use of face recognition and
other identification technologies must carefully address a number of
significant objections.
A. Constitutional Neutrality, Meaning, and Change: Skepticism About
a Constitutionally-Preferred Vision of Urban Life
One of the defining features of constitutional liberalism is its neutrality
between different visions of the good life, including those that place more

42. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166–69
(2002) (declaring unconstitutional a town law requiring those who wish to canvass door-todoor to first identify themselves in a permit application filed with the mayor’s office and
made available for public inspection); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S.
334, 342-43, 356 (1995) (striking down an Ohio law prohibiting the distribution of
anonymous campaign literature and taking note of “a respected tradition of anonymity in the
advocacy of political causes”) (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960));
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (forbidding the state of Alabama from
compelling the NAACP to disclose its membership lists).
43. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
44. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
45. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and
the Right to Anonymity, supra note 40, at 240-251.
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emphasis on community and accountability than on individualism and
anonymity. As philosopher Charles Larmore notes, “the distinctive liberal
notion is the neutrality of the state.”46 To maintain this neutrality, a liberal
regime cannot promote partisan claims about what “freedom must include,”
such as calls for enhanced “self-realization,” or greater availability of
“‘meaningful choices.’” 47 If it did so, a modern state may find itself
forcing such specific conceptions of freedom on citizens who deeply
disagree with and resent being subject to them. In the absence of liberal
neutrality, for example, religious and cultural groups organized around
tradition might be required to adhere to individualistic practices at odds
with their traditional values. To avoid subjecting groups to values deeply
at odds with their own, liberal states thus defend conceptions of
constitutional liberties that are neutral between specific visions of the good.
Such neutrality, of course, would seem absurd if it were understood to
permit the rise of an Orwellian state regime in which officials use spy
cameras to keep watch over citizens and ensure their unquestioning loyalty
by crushing all signs of dissent. Certainly, this is the image many writers
invoke to argue against the unrestricted use of face recognition and other
new surveillance technologies. Indeed, the telestory of “The Prisoner,”
described at the beginning of this essay, portrays a community with such
coercive features. 48 In “The Prisoner,” village authorities may not only
punish dissenters with ostracism and social disdain often characteristic of
tight-knit communities, but also with techniques of confinement, physical
harm, or corrective medical procedures characteristic of totalitarian
states. 49 Clearly, “neutrality” toward such institutionalized intolerance or
physical coercion would hardly be consistent with the fundamental
principles of constitutional liberalism. Advocates of liberal neutrality, such
as Larmore, recognize that liberalism strongly supports the basic freedom
entailed in “the right of the person not to face unjustifiable interference by
the state.” 50 At a minimum, liberal principles of neutrality require that the
government tolerate those who disagree with its policies, and refrain from
silencing or harming them.
Totalitarianism, however, is not the only form of collective life that can
be fitted to a landscape covered with face recognition and other
identification devices. One might see such a landscape not as a ready-made
ground for totalitarianism, but as a technologically-updated version of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 42, 47 (1987).
Id. (internal quotes in original)
See CARAZZE & OSWALD, supra note 2.
See, e.g., id. at 152-61, 182-89.
LARMORE, supra note 46, at 47.
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small town life. As I noted above, David Brin shows that a camera-covered
city need not be a dark and authoritarian one. 51 Instead of paving the way
for an omnipotent government, with godlike power over its subjects,
cameras and identification technologies might be used to empower citizens,
and to enlarge their power to keep track of both their fellow citizens and
elected officials.52 Instead of bringing a nightmarish and alien future,
video surveillance and instant identification might thus revive a more
comfortable and familiar past where people know, and know about, their
neighbors and others in their communities.53
Portrayed in these communitarian terms, a closely-surveilled city has a
very different status in a liberal constitutional order than it does if it is seen
as a manifestation of totalitarianism. Whereas totalitarianism is entirely
incompatible with fundamental principles of constitutional liberalism, this
is not true of the preference for an intimate and close-knit community, in
which accountability may trump individuality. On the contrary, such
communities are entitled to the same tolerance in a liberal order as any
other type of community. After all, a tolerant state does not demand that
small, tightly-knit communities transform themselves into larger, more
anonymous and impersonal environments. It does not hold such a
community in violation of First Amendment freedoms simply because
individuals may feel less comfortable speaking their minds there than if
they lived in a more urban setting, where views might be more diverse or
where their dissent would be less noticeable. If a small town is free to
remain a small town, why aren’t those who oversee a city just as free to
make it more like a small town? In short, while some members of a liberal
society may treasure the urban anonymity and freedom that Georg Simmel
said could not be found outside the modern metropolis, many city dwellers
(particularly in an era of deep anxiety about security) may want their
environment to be less individualistic and more like those one finds in
smaller communities. One might argue that in a tolerant liberal
constitutional order, this choice should be just as permissible as a more
individualistic one.
This vision of constitutional liberalism has found expression in many
recent debates about how liberal societies should react to “illiberal”
religious or cultural communities in their midst. William Galston, for
example, notes that the liberty of a pluralistic society must “protect the
ability of individuals and groups to live in ways that others would regard as

51. BRIN, supra note 23, at 9-10.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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unfree.” 54 And Chandran Kukathas argues that if modern communities are
to be tolerant communities, they must tolerate highly traditional and antiindividualistic communities that, instead of welcoming dissent, choose to
“ostracize the individual who refuses to conform to [their] norms.” 55 If
liberal constitutional orders must make room in their midst for traditional
communities that adopt illiberal practices, perhaps there is an equally
strong case to be made that they should make room for cities which, while
perhaps very individualistic in certain respects and more tolerant of
unconventionality and idiosyncrasy than many traditional cultural groups,
choose to keep closer watch over their citizens in order to deter, or respond
to, crime and terrorism.
Such an argument also finds support in the fact that while the First
Amendment bars state censorship, it cannot and does not eliminate the
social pressures that often make dissent or unconventional speech
uncomfortable. Thus, it would seem that to the extent a technological
framework simply exposes us and our activities to criticism and possible
ridicule from those in our community, it does not, for this reason, amount
to constitutionally-forbidden censorship. As Lee Bollinger notes, there is a
stark difference under our constitutional regime and culture between “the
use of legal penalties against speech activities” and the “employment of
nonlegal forms of coercion.” 56 While legal penalties on speech are
severely restricted by the Constitution, non-legal penalties are not only
permitted, but often encouraged. People may and do respond to offensive
speech with the “myriad of coercive responses typically at [their] disposal,”
including “ridicule or humiliation” and “any number of forms of social
shunning.” Further, people can “withhold various practical benefits, like
employment opportunities.” 57 Such penalties, as Kukathas notes, are
available to the cultural and religious communities within a liberal society,
and may be utilized to enforce adherence to their norms. 58 To the extent
that the presence of public cameras and biometric identification devices
simply makes us more accountable to the community for our behavior—
and to the state for criminal acts—why, one might ask, should a liberal
constitutional society make this option unavailable to elected
representatives and citizens? Far from ruling out this option, the liberal

54. William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 869, 877 (1999).
55. Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
CULTURES 248 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995).
56. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 13 (1986).
57. Id.
58. Kukathas, supra note 55, at 248.
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constitutional commitment to individual freedom would seem to demand
that people be left free to choose it. Individual freedom, in other words,
demands that city dwellers be free to forsake the individualism frequently
associated with cities and transform their environment into one where
accountability is more inescapable (and threats to public safety are more
detectable).
Such an argument based upon political theory might be bolstered by two
very different arguments about constitutional interpretation. On the one
hand, one might draw on “originalist” interpretation to underscore that
judges should hesitate before reading the First Amendment as protecting
individual freedoms of a sort that did not exist when the First Amendment
was drafted. At the end of the eighteenth century, after all, one could not
find the same degree of anonymity and variety that Simmel observed in the
early twentieth century.
For example, “unlike later and larger
Philadelphias, the eighteenth century town was a community.” Its
population numbered 23,700 on the eve of the revolution and its “narrow
compass” ensured that citizens of different groups lived “jumbled together”
and interacted frequently. 59 It thus seems odd to think that the First
Amendment was designed to defend an environmental background for free
expression and thought that did not exist at the time. On the other hand,
one can espouse the notion of a living constitution, whose protections
change with changing conceptions of liberty, but this arguably leaves cities
with as much freedom to adopt new expansive surveillance systems. Under
this ”evolving constitution” approach, First Amendment protection might
evolve to make room for citizens’ changing preferences about how cities
should behave (as reflected in their decisions or those of legislators and
administrators charged with honoring such preferences). Jane Jacobs, after
all, referred to rebuilding a city in the right way as a “wonderful
challenge,” providing each citizen with the “chance to reshape the city and
to make it the kind of city that he likes, and that others will too.” 60 While
Jacobs, like Simmel, recognized that such a city life may require leaving
room for “the incongruous, the vulgar, or the strange,” she sought to
preserve room for these elements of city life by inviting city dwellers to
exercise control over their environment, not by recruiting courts to
constitutionally insulate it from such control.

59. See Sam Bass Warner, Philadelphia: The Private City, in AMERICAN URBAN
HISTORY: AN INTERPRETIVE READER WITH COMMENTARIES 54, 55 (Alexander B. Callow, Jr.
ed., 3d ed. 1982).
60. Jane Jacobs, Downtown is for People, in THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 157, 184
(William H. Whyte, Jr. ed., 1958).

BLITZ_CHRISTENSEN

116

2/3/2011 10:04 PM

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

Vol.XXXII

B. Argument from Judicial Competence
There is another complementary argument that constitutional protections
should not be the safeguards of urban freedom. The argument is that courts
are, by their nature, woefully ill-equipped to assess and make binding
decisions on the social and physical conditions that make such freedom
possible. This is because such conditions are as likely to be features of a
city’s physical architecture as they are of its legal regime. Thus, most of
the contemporary writers who inherited Simmel’s admiration for urban
individualism aimed their impassioned defense of it not at courts deciding
constitutional questions, but rather at city-dwellers thinking about how they
want their environment to be designed. William H. Whyte, for example,
celebrated the city’s “variety and concentration, its tension, its hustle and
bustle,” and harshly condemned any attempt at transformation into
something more calm and rural. 61 Many city planners, he complained,
aimed to “banish the most wonderful [of] city features—the street” and
replace its vigorous heterogeneity with “anti-cities . . . sealed off from
surrounding neighborhoods as if they were set in cornfields miles away.” 62
Jane Jacobs likewise had harsh criticism for “the city destroying ideas” of
those who wished to replace the heterogeneity and privacy of cities with
the togetherness and homogeneity of small towns. 63 These writers
celebrate the opportunities for individuality and heterogeneity that Simmel
identified as the hallmark of urban culture. Decades before the spread of
cameras on public streets and parks, they worried that other attempts to
redesign the structure of cities would undercut these distinctive and
invaluable features of urban life. Thus, they called on city planners to
reject popular conceptions inherited from the “Garden City” movement and
the “Decentrists,” designed to make city life more like that in rural
settings. 64 For similar reasons, they called on them to recognize as
wrongheaded and harmful the “Radiant City” design proposed by Le
Corbusier with the underground streets and high-rises intended to unclutter
streets and park areas of pedestrians and obstacles. 65 But it would have
seemed bizarre to take these complaints to a courtroom; rather, their
61. William H. Whyte, Jr., Introduction, THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 7 (William H.
Whyte, Jr. ed., 1958).
62. Id. at 10.
63. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 39, at 20, 6263 (condemning the movement by “Decentrists” of the 1920s to “thin [cities] out, and
disperse their enterprises and populations into smaller, separated cities or, better yet, towns”
and city areas designed to promote “togetherness,” such that instead of casual and limited
contact on sidewalks, one shares significant amounts of one’s life with neighbors).
64. See id. at 16-21.
65. See id. at 21-24.
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assumption was that the freedom and diversity-enhancing character of
cities could only be saved if citizens could be persuaded it was worth
saving (and made to see what was needed to save it). 66 This assumption
appears to have held sway as newer defenders of urban individualism and
diversity revise Jacobs’ and Whyte’s criticisms of attempts to model cities
on country towns to critique “technocommunitarian” reconceptions of
urban space. 67 Responding to claims that cyberspace and other new
technological innovations can superimpose the togetherness and
transparency of community over the “difference and disorder” of modern
urban life, Kevin Robins argues that such a remaking of cities would do
substantial harm. 68 However, he does not present this danger as harm to
the constitutional order, but rather to the fabric of city life.
In short, the working assumption of such defenders of urban
individualism appears to be that it must be defended in a democratic giveand-take, and not by making their vision of city life constitutionally
required. Even writers such as Jerry Frug, who argue that the defense of
urban diversity and individuality requires a certain legal structure, and not
just a certain physical architecture, 69 generally see the defense of this legal
structure as a task for citizens and legislators, not as a task for courts giving
force to First Amendment freedoms. 70 This is due in part to the fact that
the individualism and anonymity of city life is not an unmixed blessing.
Instead, it comes with less social support than one finds in more traditional
settings and makes possible crime, and fear of crime, not present in such
settings. 71 A jurisprudence of rights may be ill-suited for reconciling the
different values at stake, and helping city dwellers decide which values
they prefer in the event they cannot have everything they want. Perhaps
constitutional freedoms are affected by developments in city design and
architecture, but this does not mean that courts have anything to say or do
about them.

66. See Jacobs, Downtown is for People, supra note 60, at 183-84.
67. See Kevin Robins, Foreclosing on the City? The Bad Idea of Virtual Urbanism, in
TECHNOCITIES: THE CULTURE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 34-59
(John Downey & Jim McGuigan eds., 1999). Robins uses the term “technocommunitarian”
primarily to describe (and critique) the notion that one can restore a lost sense of community
through new means of networked communication. I use it here to refer more broadly to any
argument that favors reviving the characteristics of a small community by technologically
transforming the urban environment.
68. Id. at 45, 47.
69. See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1104-08
(1996).
70. See, e.g., id. at 1104-05, 1107-08 (proposing redesign of “local government law”
regarding land use regulations).
71. See id.
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PART II: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE IMPERATIVE OF
PRESERVING SPACES FOR UNMONITORED EXPLORATION AND
EXPRESSION
What then could be wrong with modern cities deciding to become hightech, “easily-spanned village[s]?” Why can’t they decide for themselves if
this is a model of collective life they find attractive, and make that decision
free of judicially-imposed constraints? I argue in this Part that a closer
examination of First Amendment law, and particularly First Amendment
law on anonymity on the Internet and elsewhere, shows that there are
potential problems with both halves of “technocommunitarianism.”
A. The Electronic Village I: First Amendment Problems with the
Technological Perfection of Monitoring in Urban Spaces
First, there is a potential problem with the “high tech” part of this
transformation—not because use of modern law enforcement technology is
unwise or unacceptable, but because of how a futuristic version of “village
life” might feel when it is recreated with automated biometric eyes instead
of curious neighbors. In short, a certain amount of individual freedom
might be lost in the translation of informal monitoring by neighbors into
constant and pervasive electronic watching. One concern lies in the
difference between the respective consequences of human and electronic
monitoring. Video and audio tapes record one’s private life in greater and
more vivid detail than does human memory. As Justice Harlan noted in his
famous dissent in a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, in a world
where “recording . . . insures full and accurate disclosure of all that is said,
free of the possibility of error and oversight that inheres in human
reporting . . . [w]ords would be measured a good deal more carefully and
communication inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being
transmitted and transcribed.” 72 Such recording, worried Harlan, might well
“smother that spontaneity . . . that liberates daily life.” 73 Officials, of
course, could surveill a citizen even without video cameras, but his public
privacy would still be protected by “the likelihood that the listener will
either overlook or forget what is said, as well as the listener’s inability to
reformulate a conversation.” 74 Whereas memories tend to fade, and the
feelings associated with an event often become less powerful, hearing or
watching a tape of private actions tends to revive memories of, and
reactions to, a person’s behavior. Such tapes also provide an objective
72. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787-88 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 788.
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reference point that makes it harder for a person to explain and retell an
action she took by placing it in a broader context; for example, by
describing it in light of motives, concerns, or other background facts that
are not as vivid and uncontestable as the images captured in video. In other
words, it deprives the person of an element of freedom and autonomy that
is likely to be present even in communities where everyday life is subject to
close and frequent observation.
Another concern lies in the extent to which biometrically-equipped
cameras might eliminate even the seclusion and insulation from
observation that is available to people in places where everyone knows
everyone else. Even in a small town individuals can find places in public
to privately read a book or a letter, or have a private conversation, by
finding a physically remote area or checking to ensure that no one is near.
By contrast, in a world where cameras or microphones strewn throughout
public spaces can “zoom in” on individuals unaware of their presence, a
person may find it difficult or impossible to travel far enough away from
such electronic eyes and ears to escape their range.75 Whereas other people
might find it hard to identify them from a distance, a biometrically
equipped camera could magnify a person’s image and match it against a
database. 76
In addition, the decision of cities to transform themselves into
electronically-watched villages might be problematic for another related
reason. Not only might the electronic watching be more intense than the
observation to which people are subject in small towns and villages, it may
also be used in more worrisome ways. More specifically, there is a
significant difference between observations by one’s neighbors and
observations systematically collected by the state. Admittedly, people may
often be more comfortable being observed by (or observable to) police than
by curious neighbors. This is because police looking at video footage or
individuals picked out by face recognition scanners are more likely to be
looking only for evidence of criminal activity than are curious onlookers,
who may instead attend to and gossip about irrelevant idiosyncrasies.77 To
the extent the state strays from a focus on law enforcement, however, the
potential harm it does can be much greater given its monopoly on legalized
force. State officials and police are also more likely to notice and be
offended by political dissent of the sort that courts have often identified as
a core (if not the core) of First Amendment protections: citizens may be
75. See ROSEN, supra note 16, at 36-37.
76. Id. at 51.
77. And the state is also likely to be subject to greater scrutiny and accountability than
are private individuals. See BRIN, supra note 23, at 9.
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less likely to criticize the government if they know that the government
itself is watching. Such a problem will not necessarily be cured by Brin’s
recommendation that citizens be allowed as much access to cameras and
identification technologies as police and other officials; 78 while citizens can
theoretically use such access to detect and punish abusive action by
government authorities, in practice government opponents might be more
likely to hold their tongues than to openly challenge the government in
court or elsewhere. Moreover, such a chilling effect on opposition speech
may happen without any visible sign of abuse, making it difficult for
citizens to rally opposition to it.
This, then, is one way in which electronic surveillance and identification
technologies may run afoul of the First Amendment and other
constitutional provisions where garden-variety social pressure does not.
Government-operated electronic monitoring networks might be more
inescapable than community observation ever could be, and differs
importantly from such informal viewing and reporting in the fact that it is
government-operated.
Both of these factors have constitutional
significance.
First, while the presence of curious neighbors does not mandate that a
person disclose his identity, the presence of pervasive biometric devices
effectively does – at least when these devices do what they are meant to do
and effectively “unmask” anonymous individuals. This fact weakens the
basis for one argument against placing any constitutional limits on face
recognition or other biometric identification. One might argue that what
First Amendment anonymity cases have celebrated and defended is not the
anonymity of the crowd or street corner, but the anonymity of speech or
associational support. Such anonymity, the argument goes, is found not in
city squares or any other distinctly urban settings, but in anonymous
authorship and behind-the-scenes organizational activity. Thus, while
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay could publish their
Federal Papers under a pseudonym (“Publius”),79 this did not mean that
they could prevent neighbors from recognizing them as they walked down
the street. Similarly, NAACP members could support that organization
without the State of Alabama learning their names, but this did not mean
that they could participate in a televised march or demonstration and keep
their participation a secret. While the Supreme Court prohibited compelled
disclosure of membership lists to the government, it did not prohibit police

78. See BRIN, supra note 23, at 4, 9.
79. See Jonathan Turley, Registering Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to
Anonymity, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2001-2002 57 (James L. Swanson ed., 2002).
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observation of public activities by the group or its members. 80 Fourth
Amendment case law similarly protects “reasonable expectations of
privacy,” but does not change the fact that “[n]o person can have a
reasonable expectation that . . . his face will be a mystery to the world.”81
In short, this logic leads to the conclusion that what is constitutionally
impermissible is not identification by neighbors, acquaintances, or even
nearby police officers; rather, it is government-compelled disclosure of
one’s identity in connection with speech or association.
But a pervasive and inescapable network of identification devices blurs
this distinction between coincidental recognition and compelled
disclosure. 82 While face recognition (or other biometric identification) has
sometimes been portrayed as a high-tech equivalent of happenstance
identification by a nearby acquaintance, it can in fact operate in a way that
is practically much more like the disclosure requirements. The very act of
walking on a city street in such a world, for instance, makes it impossible
not to identify oneself to town officials. A door-to-door solicitor may not
have to go through the burden of informing a town of her identity, by
filling out a form or signing a piece of campaign literature. Yet she does
have to identify herself as a condition of performing such activity, simply
because the activity cannot be carried out without revealing her identity.
Thus, the pervasiveness of high-tech camera networks may well run afoul
of the First Amendment anonymity protections enunciated by the Supreme
Court in the 2002 case of Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
Inc. v. Stratton. 83 In that case, the Court held that door-to-door solicitors
had a right to maintain their anonymity as they engaged in protected First
Amendment activity. 84
Second, the fact that government officials operate or have regular access
to cameras and face recognition scanners has constitutional significance,
even if they are not the only ones with such access. This is because while
the First Amendment does not protect us (at least not directly) from
informal community pressures towards conformity, it does protect us from
any such pressure when it comes from the government. 85 Indeed,
government disclosure requirements are constitutionally problematic even
80. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
81. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
82. Even recognition that is planned—for example, when a private eye follows a
person—is not as inescapable as compelled disclosure, or as surveillance in a world of
pervasive and effective face-recognition cameras.
83. 536 U.S. 150, 169 (2002).
84. Id.
85. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm., 518 U.S. 727, 754 (1996).
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if the government itself refrains from imposing any punishment on speech
or association: Even if it merely facilitates community pressure or private
retaliation against a dissenter—for example, by forcing that dissenter to
reveal his connection to unpopular views or unorthodox ideas—it will
likely run afoul of First Amendment protections. Thus, the village of
Stratton was barred in Watchtower Bible from collecting identifying
information on solicitors on behalf of (and for examination by) its
residents. 86 And Congress was similarly barred from requiring individuals
interested in receiving sexually-explicit cable channels from identifying
themselves and their interests to cable carriers. In that case, the Court
noted that the requirement would “restrict viewing by subscribers who fear
for their reputations should the operator, advertently or inadvertently,
disclose the list of those who wish to watch the ‘patently offensive’
channel.” 87 The fact that punishment of such interests would likely come
from community members and not from government itself could not make
such a self-identification requirement permissible.
Even if the government does not directly silence protected speech, it
causes First Amendment harm when it aids silencing by pointing such
speech out to wielders of private power who will likely find it
objectionable. In such circumstances, the government’s role is not unlike
that of a military unit that sends up flares or shines a spotlight so that a
separate attacking force can identify its target. In so doing, that unit clearly
participates in, and aids, such an attack (made problematic when the object
of the attack is constitutionally-protected speech or association).
Of course, this analogy is much weaker if the government’s role in
undercutting anonymity is not to target any particular viewpoint or topic
(for example, the sexually-explicit programming targeted in Denver Area
Educational Television Consortium88) but rather to alter the environment in
such a way that everyone can see what anyone else says or does. In such a
circumstance, the government does not so much highlight anything with a
focused spotlight as it shines “light” everywhere so that everyone can
benefit from the increased safety and certainty that comes with having a
clear view of the surrounding environment (as well as the potential support
of others who can better see threats to the community). Still, such
viewpoint and content neutrality will not necessarily save a government
disclosure requirement, or a functionally similar measure that wrests
anonymity from speakers or information-seekers who desire it. The

86. Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 150, 155 n.2, 169.
87. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium at 754.
88. Id. at 732.
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Supreme Court made this clear in Buckley v. Valeo. 89 It concluded in that
case that there is an inherent First Amendment against the forced disclosure
of a speaker’s identity; any government measures that threaten this right
must be subjected to “exacting scrutiny,” which is necessary “because
compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the
exercise of First Amendment rights.” 90 In McIntyre v. Ohio Election
Commission, 91 the Court made it even clearer that its protection for
anonymity goes beyond protecting unpopular views. An anonymous
speaker has a First Amendment right to maintain that anonymity, it said,
not only when “economic or official retaliation” lurks just around the
corner, but also when a person simply has “a desire to preserve as much of
one’s privacy as possible.” 92 Even when the motivation is not fear of
harassment or harm, “the interest in having anonymous works enter the
marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in
requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.” 93 Thus, the Court in McIntyre
found that the restrictions on anonymous campaign pamphlets in that case
could pass constitutional muster only under the strictest form of review
(i.e.,”strict scrutiny”): they had to be “narrowly tailored to serve a an
94
overriding state interest.” The Court was able to base its holding in part
on the fact that the statute it was striking down was directed only at certain
95
speech contents, namely speech designed to influence an election.
However, even when the Court confronted a content-neutral restriction on
in the 2002 Watchtower Bible case, it made clear that it would also treat
such restrictions with significant skepticism. Although not expressly
applying strict scrutiny, it stated that even content-neutral disclosure

requirements for door-to-door solicitors were a “dramatic departure
from our national heritage and constitutional tradition” and noted
that it is not carefully tailored to the ends it is purported to serve. 96
To some extent, perhaps, this is because even disclosure measures that
are neutral on paper, and neutral in design, may predictably harm minority
points of view much more than majority viewpoints. As David Ogden and
Joel Nichols point out, “by their inherent nature bans on anonymity do not
impose burdens equally on all expression.” 97 It is rather “the most
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 64.
514 U.S. 334 (1995).
Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 342.
94
Id. at 347
95
Id. at, 345-46.
96
Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 165-66.
97. David W. Ogden & Joel A. Nichols, The Right to Anonymity Under the First
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controversial views, the fringe political parties and candidates, the
unorthodox ideas, and the least popular advocacy groups or religious sects
that will principally be deterred by bans on anonymous speech.”98 But
McIntyre’s extensive anonymity protection is justified not only as a shield
against the majority punishment of minority viewpoints, but also as a shield
that protects numerous kinds of speech or information-seeking that might
suffer or wither away in the harsh light of publicity. This shield can afford
protection for speech or intellectual exploration that might line up with
majority views, but offend particular members of a speaker’s family or
circle of associations; tentative views that individuals might be hesitant to
offer as a firm statement of their own beliefs (or a statement that could be
mistakenly viewed as such); and speech that gains some of its strength (or
even content) from the fact of the author’s anonymity. Such First
Amendment activity can of course be threatened or “chilled” by social
pressure or by fear of private penalties even when the government does not
take any action to disable it—and indeed, even when the government
affirmatively protects it. These penalties do not mean, however, that the
government can add its own damage on top of that caused by society. On
the contrary, the conclusion of McIntyre appears to be that the First
Amendment bars such damage. Thus, to the extent that governmentinstalled cameras and identification measures give government actors a role
in undermining anonymity that they do not play in the informal monitoring
of small towns and villages, they may well raise distinct First Amendment
problems.
Accordingly, a problem arises when city governments seek to convert
cities into closely-monitored, “easily-spanned villages.” The conversion
may result not simply in an insular, tight-knit community with little privacy
and anonymity, but in an extreme, technologically-distorted version of such
a community where the harm to privacy and autonomy is more extensive,
and comes in large part from a source—namely, the state—that is not
constitutionally permitted to inflict it (at least in the absence of a
compelling state interest).

B. The Electronic Village II: First Amendment Problems with
Reviving Traditional Monitoring in Urban Spaces
The video cameras and face recognition scanners emerging in cities,
moreover, are problematic not only to the extent that their intrusiveness

Amendment, 49 A.P.R. FED. LAW. 44, 47 (2002).
98. Id.
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goes beyond that of a community lacking in privacy but also to the extent
that they succeed in recreating such an environment. In other words,
“technocommunitarianism” is problematic not solely because of the
technological intrusion it makes possible, but because of its
communitarianism. This is a controversial claim. To the extent a panoptic
city-wide surveillance can be portrayed as a Frankenstein monster, alien to
anything American society has seen or tolerated in the past, it is relatively
easy to defend the claim that such a freakish and non-traditional
environment is at odds with traditional liberties. But such an accusation is
far more difficult to defend when a city’s defensive monitoring of its
inhabitants takes away no more privacy or anonymity than Americans
would lose by moving from a city to a smaller, more intimate community.
Nor is it wholly justified: Cities have changed significantly over the course
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They will likely continue to
change over the course of the twenty-first century. Furthermore, they may,
in certain respects, become more like smaller communities which, far from
being at odds with freedom or individualism, are often freely chosen by
individuals who prefer such environments to life in large cities. This does
not mean, however, that the Constitution places no barriers at all in the
face of government measures that would transform urban life into an
environment considerably less private and considerably less free than it is
now. As Iris Marion Young points out, city life provides valuable support
for individual freedom not just for city dwellers, but for other citizens of
modern societies. Such freedom is a “material given” not only for
urbanites, but for all “those who live in advanced industrial societies”; it
“define[s] the lives not only of those who live in huge metropolises, but
also of those who live in suburbs and large towns.” 99 Through the medium
of art, film, and other cultural resources, even those far outside of a city’s
boundaries can partake in its “energy, cultural diversity, technological
complexity, and [ ] multiplicity of . . . activities.” 100 Individuals may thus
benefit from urban freedom not only by living immersed in urban culture,
but by borrowing from it. Understood in this way, urban individualism
may deserve constitutional protection not because it is superior to the more
intimate life of a small town, but because modern freedoms can exist only
where the opportunities found in modern cities exist alongside of, and
supplement, such a life. Urban individualism might receive constitutional
protection, in other words, not because it is preferable to small town life,
but because it serves a crucial role in a larger system of free expression that
embraces modern citizens living both inside and outside of urban settings.
99. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 237 (1990).
100. Id.
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In this sense, the urban environment may be akin to another type of
environment that has been more widely-recognized by scholars as
deserving a special place in First Amendment jurisprudence: the Internet.
Scholars have implored courts and citizens to recognize that the Internet
empowers speakers and readers alike in unprecedented ways—and laws
should enhance, or at least avoid reversing such empowerment. Thus, Ann
Branscomb writes that the Internet “promises to become one of the most
powerful democratic tools ever devised.”101 When dealing with such an
environment, she says, “an environment unlike any heretofore made
available . . . [i]t would be tragic . . . [t]o saddle such a promise with an
overload of baggage from a bygone era.”102 Lee Tien similarly argues that
First Amendment law must register the Internet’s impressive “shift in the
architecture of everyday communication.” 103 And Yochai Benkler likewise
touts the vast increase in “the range and diversity of information” that
“individuals can access” online, and the ability this networked
communication gives them to build “an autonomously conceived and lived
life.” 104
Such claims about the unprecedented possibilities of the Internet have
been echoed in recent First Amendment decisions, and most notably in the
Supreme Court’s first major statement on Internet speech in Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union. 105 Striking down Congress’s restrictions
on indecent Web material in that case, the Court remarked that, in the age
of the Internet and the World Wide Web, “[a]ny person or organization
with a computer [and Internet connection has a] vast platform from which
to address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions of readers,
viewers, researchers, and buyers.” 106
This vision of the Internet as an area where speech protection has
extraordinary force has found expression not only in decisions about online
censorship, but also in cases about online anonymity. A series of cases
have placed high hurdles in the way of plaintiff corporations trying to
discover the identity of anonymous Internet users who allegedly defamed
them, violated their trademark, or caused them some other alleged harm
online. While not leaving these plaintiffs entirely helpless, for example,
101. Ann Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First
Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1640 (1995).
102. Id. at 1678.
103. Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L.
REV. 117, 137 (1996).
104. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Toward a Political Economy of
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1267-69 (2003).
105. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
106. Id. at 853.
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one court stressed that the need for any such discovery must “be balanced
against the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums
anonymously or pseudonymously.” 107 A New Jersey court similarly
refused to let a plaintiff corporation gain easy access to its alleged
defamers’ identity, emphasizing “the unique circumstances created by the
advent of the Internet” and role of such circumstances in deciding cases
where the anonymity of Internet users is at stake. 108 It also demanded that
plaintiffs meet a high threshold before they could undercut the anonymity
of their online critics, and found that plaintiffs did not meet it. 109 In short,
such online “Jane and John Doe” cases have “generally awarded
anonymous speech a high level of First Amendment protection,” with most
of them “quash[ing] subpoenas or motions seeking the identities of
defendants.” 110 These cases honor many scholars’ calls to carefully guard
the freedom-enhancing character of the Internet, and are consistent with
Lee Tien’s observation that “lack of identity information” (and the
anonymity resulting from it) is an important part of this freedom. 111
But, if the Internet constitutes an unusual First Amendment
environment, where certain distinctive freedom-enhancing characteristics
must be protected, it is not the only such environment. Almost a century
before scholars celebrated the remarkable opportunities that the Internet
offers for enhancing individual autonomy, Georg Simmel wrote of the
similarly unprecedented increase in individual autonomy made possible by
the rise of modern cities.112 In the same way that later writers marveled at
the diversity of Web-based information sources from which individuals
could build distinctive lives, appropriate to idiosyncratic interests, Simmel

107. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Thus,
where traditional discovery rules might have allowed an angry plaintiff to run roughshod
over this “legitimate and valuable right,” the Court formulated a higher discovery threshold
for cases involving anonymous Web users. Id. Plaintiffs had to (1) “identify the missing
party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real
person or entity who could be sued in federal court;” (2) “identify all previous steps taken to
locate the elusive defendant;” (3) “establish to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit
against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss;” and (4) “file a request for discovery
with the Court, along with a statement of reasons justifying the specific discovery requested
as well as identification of a limited number of persons or entities on whom the discovery
process might be served and for which there is reasonable likelihood that the discovery
process will lead to identifying information that would make service of process possible.”
Id. at 578-80.
108. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 767 (2001).
109. Id.
110. Victoria Smith Elkstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and
the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 418 (2003).
111. Tien, supra note 103, at 163-64.
112. Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life, supra note 9, at 337-39.
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remarked on how the diversity made possibly by urban settings nourishes
“individual independence and the elaboration of personal peculiarities.”113
And just as later writers would emphasize the unparalleled anonymity that
the Internet makes possible, Simmel identified as one crucial element of
urban freedom the fact that “we do not know by sight neighbors of years
standing.” 114
The parallel between the freedoms of the Web and the freedom of
modern cities raises the question of whether the First Amendment—and
other core constitutional principles—really demands neutrality between
different forms of urban community. Legal scholars writing about the Web
have not demanded such neutrality with respect to cyberspace. In other
words, not all possible Internet architectures are equal in light of our
constitutional values. Thus, Lawrence Lessig warns that changes in the
“code” that underlies the architecture of the Internet constitute a “new
threat to liberty.” 115 With changes in such code, government could take a
medium that gives individuals an unprecedented degree of liberation, and
convert it into something marked by the constraints (and controllability) of
ordinary space.
For example, government might undermine the anonymity in Web life
that frees people from many aspects of their identities in the physical world
(or offer incentives for private companies to do so). 116 As Tien notes, by
removing visual cues, cyberspace “permits [individuals] to have selves
unencumbered by appearance or gender.” 117 Lessig likewise notes, “the
architecture of the original [unregulated] cyberspace” gives to those
disabled by blindness, deafness, or perceived unattractiveness, a significant
freedom from these conditions. The Internet gives them “something they
did not have in real space,” namely, the ability to communicate easily
without anybody knowing certain aspects of their lives. 118 If Web sites
adopt and use “identification technologies” that make it a simple matter for
the government learn who has viewed a particular site or posted a particular
message, such measures will sharply curtail the expressive freedom the
Internet now provides. Furthermore, as Lessig notes, Internet anonymity
will be on extremely precarious ground when such “identification
technologies” incorporate “biometric keys”—requiring a person to access a
Web site with his thumb, retina, or “whatever body part turns out to be

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 338.
Id. at 331.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 86 (1999).
Id. at 50.
Tien, supra note 103, at 166-67.
LESSIG, supra note 115, at 50.
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cheapest to certify.” 119
If there is reason to be disturbed about trading our newfound electronic
freedoms for the familiar chains of “real space,” why isn’t there similar
reason for concern when cities sacrifice the freedoms of real space for the
more closely-monitored communal arrangements of an earlier age? Why
isn’t a biometrics-driven elimination of anonymity just as worrisome in
urban space as it is in cyberspace? And why should the neutrality of
constitutional liberalism demand that courts and others stand back and let
the future happen with respect to government-imposed changes in one of
these environments, but not in the other?
PART III: PUBLIC FORA AND ANONYMOUS SPACE
I suggest in this article that constitutional liberalism makes no such
demand. On the contrary, just as courts generally appear to recognize and
respect the significance of the Internet as the foundation for much of our
existing marketplace of ideas, so courts have recognized in the past that
features of urban life and other physical settings deserve a similar kind of
respect and protection.
Indeed, our existing First Amendment
jurisprudence already protects certain features of urban space. Far from
being entirely neutral, courts have long held fast to the notion that
governments who manage public parks are compelled by the First
Amendment to recognize and respect the fact that these spaces have
“immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.” 120 For this reason,

content-based regulations in such settings are subject to strict
scrutiny, and even content-neutral regulations must be “narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication.” 121
As is true for the electronic space of the Internet, there is nothing
inevitable about the vision of parks as a sanctuary for speech and debate.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s statement in Hague that such parks have
constituted a refuge for speech, “from time out of mind,” is inaccurate. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, before the Supreme Court
classified parks as “quintessential public fora” where the First Amendment
interests are entitled to special weight, park authorities often promulgated
strict rules about what kind of speech and assembly was permissible within

119. Id. at 57-58.
120. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
121.
Perry Education Assn’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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park boundaries. In England, for example, “[r]eligious and political
meetings were a part of urban life, but as parks were seen as peaceful
places, such potentially divisive activities were generally prohibited.”122
Similarly, American parks of the nineteenth century made sure to keep
“discussions of politics and religion out of park programming.” 123
In the late nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes—then Chief
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court—found that there was nothing
impermissible about such speech restrictions. “For the legislature
absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park,” he wrote, “is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of
the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”124
This opinion was upheld by the United States Supreme Court.125 The shift
that has since occurred in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
indicates that, in contrast to Holmes’ late nineteenth-century opinion, the
current-day Court believes that freedom of expression cannot flourish
unless citizens have environments of a kind that can support it. The
Internet represents one such environment. Municipal parks, public streets
and plazas, and other common meeting grounds in “real space” provide
others.
This equation between expressive freedom on the Internet and in parks
may seem odd. The Internet is not a quintessential public forum. A public
forum, such as a street or park, is a type of government-owned property.
While it may be provided by the government or with government funds, the
“virtual space” that exists on the Web is not government-owned space, but
rather space that, for the most part, is owned and managed by private
parties. Focusing only on the government ownership of public fora,
however, obscures the fundamental respect in which they are similar to
virtual spaces.
The importance of both of these spaces is the
“environmental support” they provide for speakers and information-seekers
that might otherwise have difficulty finding a reliable and affordable space
for First Amendment activity. The Internet, as scholars and courts alike
have emphasized, provides an unparalleled opportunity for expression and
information-seeking even to those who can afford little more than a
computer and Internet connection. In this sense, as writers such as Lee
Tien have pointed out, Internet speech is “cheap speech,” reminiscent of

122. HAZEL CONWAY, PEOPLE’S PARKS: THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF VICTORIAN
PARKS IN BRITAIN 190 (1991).
123. GALEN CRANZ, THE POLITICS OF PARK DESIGN: A HISTORY OF URBAN PARKS IN
AMERICA 23, 77 (1982).
124. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895).
125. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 44 (1897)

BLITZ_CHRISTENSEN

2005

2/3/2011 10:04 PM

TECHNOCOMMUNITARIANISM

131

the writings of “lonely pamphleteers.” 126 Public spaces such as streets and
parks are similar in that they provide another key First Amendment
resource for those who might otherwise be unable to marshal resources to
find an audience for their views or compatriots for group expression. As
the Supreme Court emphasized in Hague, much like open markets where
buyers and sellers know to look for each other, public parks and streets
provide natural gathering points where speakers can go to find a potential
audience for their ideas, and information-seekers can go to select from a
thriving marketplace of ideas. 127 In the absence of such protected meeting
grounds, “buyers” and “sellers” in the marketplace of ideas would have to
expend far more resources (perhaps including resources they do not have)
to find each other, or congregate (or demonstrate) with like-minded
individuals.
Because such environments provide a key support for First Amendment
communications, the basic architecture of these spaces cannot be as “value
neutral,” or as vulnerable to hasty redesign, as are other realms within a
liberal democracy. In this sense they are unlike other organizational forms
in a liberal democracy that can shift, in chameleon-like fashion, to fit the
values of whatever group inhabits them. The rules of a church or a private
school or university, for example, can be bent or revised in large part to fit
the mission and world view of whatever group runs it. Many employers
and residential areas can likewise accommodate themselves to specific
value systems. They can adopt traditional group ideals at odds with
individualism. Thus, many of the great thinkers of the liberal tradition
have recognized that within a liberal order, one may find markedly illiberal
groups. 128 But in order for First Amendment expression to remain a real
and ever-present opportunity in the midst of such social malleability, there
are spaces within a liberal constitutional order that are set aside, and remain
set aside, for untrammeled First Amendment debate and exploration. Seen
in this light, the distinctive freedoms that Georg Simmel attributed to urban
spaces are not temporary benefits that can simply be traded away for other
benefits, or transformed to fit very different values; rather, the openness
one currently finds in the streets and parks of these spaces is a key, nonnegotiable element that cannot be sacrificed without undermining existing
First Amendment jurisprudence. To make such a sacrifice would not only

126. Tien, supra note 103, at 121.
127. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
128. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 261 (1993) (noting that whereas the
“basic structure” of a society must be governed by liberal principles of justice, “for churches
and universities different principles are plainly more suitable”—more specifically, those
principles that arise from the “shared aims and purposes” of the organization).
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hurt those city dwellers who live near parks. It would also undercut the
First Amendment interests of speakers (or listeners) from smaller
communities who come to spread a message (or receive one), and the
readers in all types of communities who will ultimately review and partake
in the debates generated in such public spaces.
It is still conceivable, perhaps, that courts would nonetheless find that
cameras and effective face-recognition devices meet the legal threshold
normally demanded of content-neutral measures in streets and parks:
Courts might conclude that carte blanche use of such powerful surveillance
devices is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government

interest,” namely its interest in battling crime and terrorism, and that
it “leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication,”
because – in watching citizens – the cameras do not silence them. 129
But such a conclusion would be a questionable one. At a minimum,
the “narrow tailoring” requirement appears to require some showing
that the design and institutional operation of the cameras will
effectively limit them to the significant interests that justify their
presence. Additionally, it would be rash to conclude that a dragnet
surveillance system leaves open “alternative channels” of
communication simply because citizens may still hold private
conversations under the close watch of the state. Where anonymity
is an important condition for protected speech, then an alternative
channel is only viable alternative where it offers the anonymity that
the cameras threaten to eliminate.
There is also another more important reason that unrestrained
video surveillance causes unacceptable damage to a public forum –
even if watching citizens’ expressive activity does not technically
count as regulating it under the First Amendment. “Quintessential”
public fora, such as streets and parks, are classified as such because
there is something about their character that makes them natural
places for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Even if the government’s
surveillance measures do not technically run afoul of the court’s tests
for content-based and content-neutral speech regulations in public
fora, the government could easily undercut a key and long-standing
element of First Amendment jurisprudence if were allowed to
transform traditional preserves of free and vigorous discussion into
zones subject to constant and unrestrained official monitoring.
Indeed, it is not simply the concrete features of public spaces, such as
129.

Perry Education Assn’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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streets and parks, which have a special status under the Constitution.
Intangible environmental characteristics, such as possibilities for
anonymity in public space and elsewhere, receive protection as well. It is
difficult to make sense of the Court’s current jurisprudence of anonymous
speech unless one understands it as intended not only to protect against an
author’s unwilling disclosure of identity, but also to protect the possibility
of anonymous speech and information-seeking more generally. In other
words, like the electronic and physical sanctuaries that liberal societies
have set aside to support robust debate and exchange of ideas, the
opportunity for anonymity represents a kind of environmental condition—
one which is a precondition for significant First Amendment activities.
Just as the “vast platform” provided by the Web and the natural assembly
point presented by streets and parks dramatically lower the costs of
effective free expression for ordinary citizens, the opportunity for
anonymity also reduces the cost of such speech by placing it within the
reach of many who would not otherwise risk the opprobrium and social
penalty they might face if they challenged, or rethought, conventional
views in public. As Judith Shklar has written, the liberty to speak out and
dissent against the powers that be, both political and social, must be
available not only to “saints” and “heroes” but also to ordinary citizens,
with ordinary amounts of courage. 130 Anonymity helps put dissent and free
expression within their reach.
At first glance, this argument may seem to restate First Amendment
jurisprudence on anonymity somewhat awkwardly and inaccurately. It
does not, for example, distinguish between compelled disclosure, which is
the key target of McIntyre and other anonymous speech cases, and other
government measures that make recognition of a person more likely.
Indeed, one might claim that the argument presented here runs directly
counter to another recent case; namely, the Second Circuit’s 2004 decision
that the First Amendment does not rule out “anti-mask” laws. In Church of
American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, the Second Circuit upheld
New York’s anti-mask law and rejected the Ku Klux Klan’s claim that the
right of anonymous speech protected in McIntyre allowed Klan members to
hold a public demonstration while wearing masks. 131 McIntyre, said the
Court, was about compelled disclosure.132 “The Supreme Court,” it
stressed, “has never held that freedom of association or the right to engage
in anonymous speech entails a right to conceal one’s appearance in a public

130. JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 6 (1986).
131. See 356 F.3d 197, 211 (2d Cir. 2004).
132. Id. at 208-09.
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demonstration.” 133 The Court then considered, and swiftly rejected, the
view that the chilling effect of such an anti-mask law raised First
Amendment problems. The First Amendment “does not guarantee ideal
conditions for [expressing viewpoints], since the individual’s right to
speech must always be balanced against the state’s interest in safety.”134
This holding, one might argue, undercuts the claim that the First
Amendment broadly protects the possibility of anonymity. Rather than
promote an “ideal environment” in which dissenters or protesters could feel
comfortable, the Court’s anonymity cases serve the more limited goal of
protecting against one particular type of damage to anonymity: namely,
compelled disclosure by an individual writer of his identity or by a group of
its membership. Thus, the argument goes, the anti-disclosure case law
cannot be invoked against technologies like face recognition, that
“unmask” people from a far, rather than forcing them to reveal themselves
through compelled speech.. Admittedly, there are a number of reasons that
the First Amendment would conceivably restrict compelled disclosure, but
provide no protection against other measures that undermine anonymity.
One possibility is that the harm that such anonymous speech cases guard
against is only harm that results from unwanted publicity. That kind of
harm, after all, can result from either compelled disclosure (that was barred
in McIntyre) or the compelled revelation of one’s face to on-lookers (that
was allowed in Kerik). Rather, cases such as McIntyre might be understood
as guarding against another harm as well; namely, the violation of
autonomy that arises when someone is forced to voice or write words at
odds with her wishes. This, says Lee Tien, is what happens when an
anonymous author is forced to state his name. 135 In such a circumstance,
his right “not to speak” is violated in a way that it is not violated when a
speaker is simply made easier to identify instantaneously—for example, by
forbidding the wearing of masks or by lining city streets with face
recognition-equipped cameras.
But this view of the Court’s anonymous speech jurisprudence depends
heavily on McIntyre’s claim that anonymity is necessarily a part of a
work’s content, and that by removing this anonymity and forcing the author
to replace it with a name, one is forcibly changing the content of his
speech, and thereby putting words in his mouth. This claim, however, is an
odd one. In some circumstances, anonymous authorship does seem to be a
part and parcel of the work’s message. In some works of art, for example,
an artist intentionally leaves a certain amount of mystery about his identity
133. Id. at 209.
134. Id.
135. See Tien, supra note 103, at 133.
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because of what such mystery adds to the content of the work. In some
cases, he uses a pseudonym chosen to illuminate the content of the work.
In other cases, however, one’s name is no more integral a part of the work
itself than a fax cover sheet is a part of the message it carries.
Even in such circumstances, the absence or presence of a particular
name can affect how the accompanying speech is perceived. But in this
respect, anonymity is no different from many aspects of a work that are
normally considered part of its manner of presentation and not its content.
For example, the loud volume of a speech or the kind of paper a book is
printed on may well be chosen by an author or distributor in order to effect
how the content is perceived. As Lee Bollinger points out, so-called
“manner” regulations are difficult to distinguish from “content” regulations
as they may well “impinge on more than the circumstances under which the
speech activity can occur.” 136 More problematic for the view that
anonymity is content is that almost any “circumstances under which the
speech activity [occurs]” can conceivably be said to be a part of its
content. 137 A speaker may well claim, for example, that his political
speech has a different meaning in front of the White House than it does on
a random street corner.
There is, moreover, another more serious problem for the claim that
anonymity protection should focus only on the harms of compelled
disclosure: such protections could rather easily be circumvented by having
someone else do the disclosing, thus obviating the need to force this
information from an unwilling speaker. Consider, for example, the
circumstances in Watchtower Bible v. Stratton. 138 The Village of Stratton’s
ordinance demanded that individuals fill out a form identifying
themselves. 139 But the police could also have had them appear for a photo,
which might then have been matched against a driver’s license database.
Their only obligation would then be to appear and stand still for the
cameras, not to say or write anything. Face recognition, of course, could
make the same process much simpler and even less cumbersome for the
solicitors in that case. They would not even need to appear before town
authorities. All they would need to do would be to walk down the street
while automatic devices do the disclosing, perhaps without the speaker
even noticing. This would solve the compelled disclosure problem. But it
wouldn’t solve the anonymous speech problem that caused the Court to
strike down the Ohio law in Stratton, which was not about forced speech,
136.
137.
138.
139.

BOLLINGER, supra note 56, at 202-03.
Id.
536 U.S. 150 (2002).
Id.
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but about unwanted identification in circumstances where solicitors might
want to, and are normally able to remain anonymous.
Likewise, it is not compelled disclosure that is the central harm in the
anonymous association cases. In cases such as NAACP v. Alabama,140 or
Bates v. Little Rock,141 the Court’s concern was not that a group’s
leadership was forced to engage in an involuntary speech act, but rather
that the members of the group might be subject to harm as a consequence
of losing their anonymity. The compelled disclosure forbidden in these
decisions could be avoided by enabling the state to spy on certain groups
and record the names of their members. For example, a state-operated
surveillance camera might zoom in on and capture images of a membership
list in the event that a group leaves it open to public observation. Or
perhaps biometric cameras could identify and create records of who
attended the group’s meetings.
Again, while avoiding compelled
disclosure, such state actions would squarely conflict with the purpose of
the associational anonymity decisions—to assure that associational activity
could remain shielded from retaliation by those opposed to it.
How then might one make sense of the Kerik decision against the
Court’s anonymous speech jurisprudence, and what implication does this
decision have for the development of powerful identification technologies
intended for installment in city streets? The best account of Kerik is that,
while the First Amendment does give people a right to remain unidentified
in many circumstances, it does not give them a right to become
unidentifiable and untraceable. 142
This distinction between anonymity and untraceability parallels the
distinction that exists in the wiretapping context between the right to avoid
being wire-tapped (without probable cause) and the right to make one’s
telephone facilities “wire-tap proof.” While the former right against wire
tapping is now an established part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as
well as statutory law, the latter right has no such constitutional status and
has been clearly repudiated by Congress in the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), which requires telephone
service providers to make electronic surveillance possible over their
facilities so that such facilities cannot be used by criminals or terrorists to

140. 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
141. 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960).
142. For illuminating and more detailed discussions of the contrast between “traceable”
and “untraceable” anonymity (especially as that distinction applies to the law of cyberspace)
see generally A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enemies, 1995 J. ONLINE L, art. 4
(1995) and David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity,
Psuedonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1996).
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escape monitoring by law enforcement. 143
The reliance on a distinction between anonymity and untraceability is
not without problems. As I have argued elsewhere,144 even where a
government entity or private actor simply increases its capacity to monitor
individuals’ privacy—for example, by installing, but not activating bugging
devices or secret cameras—it can cause many of the harms that actual
monitoring causes even if the observer does not engage in any spying. A
person’s concern that he has become much more vulnerable to monitoring
can be just as constraining as actually being monitored; if he is unsure
whether the video camera is operating or not, he may have to assume that
anything he does may be captured on tape. Indeed, even if he remains
unaware that the installation of a camera or bug has compromised his
privacy, this compromise still does harm by breaching a barrier that
protects individuals from monitoring at the whim of the state. Thus, one
court squarely rejected a defendant’s argument, in a privacy tort case, that
he never intruded upon the plaintiff couple’s privacy because there was no
showing that he actually used the listening and recording device he had
installed in their bedroom. 145 One might similarly question the Supreme
Court’s assumption—in United States v. Karo 146—that no Fourth
Amendment violation could have occurred where an installed beeper has
not yet been activated.147 And one might likewise question the suggestion
I made above, that laws which require people to remain identifiable do not
necessarily cause the same harm as laws that require them to identify
themselves.
This analysis has implications for how one thinks about the use of
biometric technology: laws which require everyone to enter face prints,
fingerprints, or DNA samples for future identification are not necessarily
saved from Fourth Amendment challenge by the fact that police have not
yet used biometric technologies to specifically identify them. Unlike a law
that simply requires that masks be removed, such a biometric data
collection scheme would make it potentially simple for authorities to
breach anonymity with little effort, and make individuals far less secure in
the belief that what they do anonymously today will not be linked to them
tomorrow. On the other hand, one can envision face recognition

143. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279.
144. Blitz, supra note 32, at 1447-48.
145. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1965) (finding that publicity
with respect to private matters is an injury to personality “[w]hether [it is] actual or
potential”).
146. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
147. Id. at 706.
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technologies—supplemented with scrambling devices—which allow police
to collect basic information about what people are doing without
immediately learning of their identities. Then, if police have a need to
“unscramble” and identify someone in a section of footage, technology
might allow them to do so (subject to a showing of necessity), thus making
individuals traceable although not immediately identifiable by law
enforcement. Researchers trying to reconcile privacy and face recognition
have begun developing precisely this kind of technology. 148 Of course,
there are still difficult questions one would have to address about whether
making people’s identities traceable in this way leaves their anonymity too
vulnerable. This is not an easy question, and would probably require
developing some “bright line” tests that do not correspond perfectly with
every case-specific intuition. In any event, such an approach would, at the
very least, identify two poles that are unacceptable given First Amendment
and security interests; namely, instantaneous biometric identification, on
the one hand, and complete untraceability on the other.
This rethinking of Kerik’s anti-mask decision, and its relationship to the
Supreme Court’s anonymous speech thus aids us in understanding why
municipal governments may not have carte blanche, under the First
Amendment, to line streets with face recognition devices.
More
significantly, the above discussion of First Amendment law and free speech
on the Web provides one powerful answer, suggested by First Amendment
precedent, to the question with which this article began; namely, does the
Constitution in any sense favor urban landscapes that allow for greater
freedom and individuality, or do defenders of such individuals simply have
to make their peace with the notion that the openness and anonymity of
twentieth-century cities was just a historical phase rather than a
constitutional right? The first part of the answer is that the openness and
anonymity of twentieth-century cities is both a historical phase and a
constitutional right. It is a historical development, but one that the Court
now recognizes as supporting First Amendment freedoms (just as it
recognizes the Web as playing a similar role). Such a claim may appear to
be at odds both with those approaches to constitutional interpretation that
rely on original (pre-twentieth century) understandings of constitutional
liberties, as well as those that provide courts with freedom to adopt new
conceptions of such liberties, narrower than those of an earlier, less
security-conscious age. But as Randy Barnett points out, “with any theory
of textual interpretation, not just originalism, there is a need to establish the
appropriate degree of abstraction or generality which properly attaches to

148. See Blitz, supra note 32, at 1475-76 & n. 559.
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particular provisions.” 149 The original meaning of particular language,
such as “freedom of speech,” may be “underdeterminate,” leaving room for
“constitutional construction within the bounds established by original
meaning,” 150 and perhaps for manifestations of expressive liberty that
eighteenth-century citizens could not have anticipated. Moreover, even if
one places “bounds” on constitutional interpretation from some source
other than original meaning—for example, from subsequent constitutional
transformations outside of the formal amendment process151—such bounds
could prevent electoral or legislative majorities from sharply curtailing the
openness and anonymity modern Americans can find in public fora (at least
in the absence of additional “higher lawmaking”). Thus, my argument here
is not for or against any particular approach to constitutional interpretation,
but rather for the notion that if key, long-established features of our First
Amendment jurisprudence are to be preserved, any such interpretation must
leave some room for the incomparable freedom that Simmel found in the
modern metropolis.
The above discussion of First Amendment law also suggests an answer
to the question of how we can reconcile liberal neutrality with a
constitutional approach that gives preference to a specific (e.g., urban) ideal
of the good life. The Constitution does in some sense favor urban
landscapes that allow for greater freedom and individuality, but this is not
because our constitutional regime prefers such environments over others,
but because it demands a larger social environment that at least includes
such environments as important (and widely-accessible) components. Such
a limit on municipal redesign follows from courts’ demands that key public
152
including streets, parks, and plazas, retain a
spaces in urban life,
character that favors robust debate and individual expression—and from
their demand that the anonymity one finds among strangers continues to be
available to speakers and listeners alike.

149. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Non-Originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 644
(1999). See also LAURENCE H., TRIBE AND MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITION
73-80 (1991) (arguing that those charged with applying constitutional rights must confront
the question of “what level of generality to use” in interpreting those rights).
150. Id. at 645.
151. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE I: FOUNDATIONS 41-44, 50-57, 266-94
(1991) (arguing that Americans can act, and have acted, as a constitution-making majority
outside of the formal amendment process).
152. This First Amendment protection in streets, parks, and other traditional public
forums also applies outside of cities, in small, less anonymous communities. But although it
is meant for all environments – and not just cities – public forum doctrine necessarily
safeguards the greater sense of freedom from monitoring and constraint one often finds in
an urban public spaces. See supra, at 110.
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Of course, in some respects the suitability of streets and parks for these
purposes is a question of architectural design and planning rather than of
First Amendment law. Thus, some of the harshest criticism that Jane
Jacobs directs at modern city planning accuses it of deadening public fora
such as sidewalks and parks. 153 Sidewalks, for example, become
inappropriate for vibrant and heterogeneous city life when one “cleanses”
them of stores and other appropriate sites for people to engage in casual
conversation. Where sidewalk life is marked by trees, flowers, and
attractive paving, but lacks places for casual contact, social gatherings are
forced from public sites, like stores, into private places, like individuals’
houses, and thus into a setting where contact and conversation is less
temporary and less consistent with privacy. 154 In such circumstances, a
“suburbanlike sharing of private lives grow[s]” in place of “city sidewalk
life.” 155 But while such planning questions implicate zoning law, they do
not make sidewalk design a matter of First Amendment law.
Similarly, Jacobs draws on issues of park placement and design, and not
public forum law, when she argues that modern city planners often design
parks that will predictably become blighted and frightening places for
many citizens to explore or congregate. 156 The solution is not to enlist
courts and constitutional provisions to force cities into designing parks
correctly, but rather to drive home the point that parks must be placed near
natural “focal points” for city dwellers, near places where “life swirls—
where there is work, cultural, residential and commercial activity,” and not
places where people have little reason to be or visit in their everyday
lives. 157
One might well describe the installation of cameras and biometric
identification devices in similar terms: while such changes have significant
implications for urban anonymity, one might argue that they are design
changes rather than censorship laws. And if they deaden life in streets,
parks, and other plazas, writers in the mold of Jane Jacobs and William H.
Whyte can tell citizens (and legislators) why this is the case instead of
looking for courts to provide a solution. But I believe this analogy stems
from a misconception. In the first place, the city planning choices that
Jacobs and White scorn are not intended to deaden public space and silence
its inhabitants. The sterility of public life that follows such design is in

153.
39.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See generally JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, supra note
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 101.
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many cases an unintended consequence.
By contrast, emerging
surveillance systems are often intended to roll back some of the openness
and anonymity that make freedom from government control possible in
public spaces (and unfortunately help shield criminals as well as others
from ongoing state monitoring). Moreover, a design change is not only a
design change if it is clearly the functional equivalent of a law that wrests
away citizens’ anonymity. The latter is a more profound threat to citizens’
use of public space, especially since it tends to arise not from discrete
design choices in certain parks or neighborhoods that might be
counterbalanced with better decisions elsewhere, but rather from a
comprehensive municipal policy to intensify the surveillance of a city’s
public spaces. Consider, for example, the video surveillance system now
being planned for Chicago. This policy does not involve case-by-case
addition of cameras to a particular park or street corner, but rather
placement of numerous cameras throughout public space that will “make
[Chicago residents] some of the most closely observed in the world.”158
And this public video surveillance measure will be supplemented with a
“Homeland Security” fiber optic grid that is “1,000 miles long with
cameras and biochemical sensors to watch for signs of terrorism, crime and
traffic tie-ups.” 159 One would misunderstand the proposed Chicago
surveillance system by describing it merely as an inept design of public
urban space. It is a well thought-out plan to closely monitor space that has
traditionally served as a key preserve of First Amendment activity.
This does not mean that courts should invoke First Amendment
anonymity protections to order removal of all such surveillance systems.
On the contrary, as I have argued in the Fourth Amendment context, such
technological advances in surveillance can offer great benefits to citydwellers and others who feel in need of greater protection against terrorism
and other violent crime. They may even play an admirable role (albeit a
partial one) in remedying some of the blight and fear that, as Jacobs
laments, has driven vibrant pedestrian life away from sidewalks and
neighborhood parks, particularly in poorer areas. Indeed, Jacobs herself
notes that one of the keys to keeping sidewalks safe, and thus attractive for
pedestrians, is to assure that “public street spaces have eyes on them as
continuously as possible.” 160 Jacobs was talking about the natural
158. Steven Kinzer, Chicago Moving to “Smart” Surveillance Cameras, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2004, at A18.
159. Hal Dardick, City to Keep Eyes Peeled Big Time, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 11, 2005,
at C1.
160. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 39, at 38. See
also David J. Barron and Gerald E. Frug, After 9/11: Cities, 34 URB. LAW. 583, 592 (2002)
(drawing on Jacobs’ observation to challenge the assumption that cities are more vulnerable
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surveillance that comes with having numerous other pedestrians in the area,
but public cameras and biometric identification devices can provide more
continuous watch, better ability to identify and apprehend criminals, and
more immediate contact with police officials who might intervene in
criminal activity before harm is done (indeed, many cameras feed directly
into police monitoring stations). The supplementation of natural with
artificial surveillance, however, should not come at the expense of the other
crucial benefits provided by the life of sidewalks and parks. In the first
place, such surveillance must not be designed in such a way that deprives
people of the privacy they generally find so crucial in city life. The
presence of other pedestrians does not do this: for the reasons Jacobs
explains, even sharing the sidewalk with dense crowds of people does not
entail sharing all of your life. On the contrary, while such temporary
contact is enriching and enjoyable, and helps everyone on sidewalks feel
more secure that they will have nearby support in times of danger, it does
not give people a large window into one another’s lives. If the new and
powerful forms of artificial surveillance destroy such public privacy, and
drive neighbors and acquaintances toward the more complete revelation
that is characteristic of smaller, more closely monitored communities, then
they will alter the character of public urban spaces.
The solution, as I have argued in the Fourth Amendment context, is not
to bar local governments from making use of cameras and identification
technologies, but rather to ensure that they are designed to coexist with,
rather than displace, the anonymity and freedom that has long been an
invaluable feature of such spaces. To this end, courts, legislators, and
others charged with upholding constitutional values can require that public
cameras, wherever possible, include design features or operate under
institutional rules that limit damage to individuals’ anonymity as far as
possible. 161 They might insist, for example, on technologies that
“scramble” faces in video images, unmasking them only when necessary
for a criminal or terrorism investigation, or for other tasks crucial for
protecting public safety. 162 They might also insist that even scrambled
video recordings can only be watched by those law enforcement officials
with a need to see them. Far from paving the way for everyone to monitor
everyone else, then, such technologies might transform criminal and
terrorist investigations without displacing the freedom from monitoring
made possible by modern urban environments.
It is still likely that changes in city life will one day force city-dwellers
to terrorism and other violent crime than are communities with lower population density).
161. Blitz, supra note 32, at 1456-1478.
162. Id.
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to experience something akin to the environmental shock experienced by
the “The Prisoner” when he opened his apartment window to find an
unfamiliar world outside. 163 It is likely, for example, that the streets, parks,
and buildings of the future will look strikingly different than they do today.
But that does not mean that the constitutional values of that world should
be as unfamiliar to modern-day writers as its physical appearance. For the
reasons I have described in this article, even if parks, streets, and other
spaces in the urban environment come to have a very different feel and
appearance, existing principles of First Amendment jurisprudence require
that they continue to serve their long-standing function of providing
individuals with spaces that are well-suited to host a free and unconstrained
marketplace of ideas.

163. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.

